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Abstract. Counterfeit (or falsified) and substandard medicines pose a major public health risk. We describe the
findings of Operation Storm I and II conducted in 2008–2009 to combat counterfeit medicines through partnership
between national customs, Drug Regulatory Agencies (DRAs), and police in Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar,
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Samples were obtained from seizures and market surveillance by national DRAs.
Laboratory analysis using spectroscopic and chromatographic techniques and examination of packaging were performed.
Ninety-three suspect antibiotics and 95 antimalarial samples were collected. Of the 93 antibiotics, 29 (31%) had % active
pharmaceutical ingredient content (%API) < 85% or > 115% (including one counterfeit). Of the 95 antimalarials, 30 (32%)
had %API < 85 > 115% API (including one counterfeit). A significant minority of samples, antimalarials (13%) and
antibiotics (15%), were collected in plastic bags with minimal or no labeling. Of 20 ampicillin samples, 13 (65%)
contained < 85% API (with one counterfeit containing additional amoxicillin). Of 34 oral artesunate samples, 7 (21%)
contained %API out of the 85–115% range. Coordinated and synergistic partnership adopted by the participating
countries, International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), World Health Organization (WHO), and labora-
tories facilitated a platform for discussions and intelligence sharing, helping to improve each participating country’s
capacity to combat poor-quality medicines.
INTRODUCTION
There is an increasing concern that the supply of essential
medicines (WHO 2010) in financially poor countries is con-
taminated with counterfeit and substandard medicines.1–16
Such “medicines” increase mortality and morbidity, engender
drug resistance, and cause economic losses for patients, health
systems, and the pharmaceutical industry.
Building on Operation Jupiter,8 an operation to investigate
falsified artesunate in southeast Asia, International Criminal
Police Organization (INTERPOL), together with the World
Health Organization (WHO) set up Operation Storm in the
Greater Mekong region of southeast Asia. Operation Storm I
and II were conducted by seven participating countries
(Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Singapore,
Thailand, and Vietnam) between April 2008 and November
2009. This multi-country operation provided a common plat-
form for coordination meetings and training. Three national
agencies, the customs, Drug Regulatory Agencies (DRAs),
and the police in each participating country conducted joint
operations to investigate suspected pharmaceutical crime.
There has been confusion and controversy over the defini-
tions of counterfeit and substandard medicines. We use the
term counterfeit medicines to describe those “. . .deliberately
and fraudulently mislabeled with respect to identity and/or
source.” Counterfeiting can apply to both innovative and generic
products and may include products with the correct ingredi-
ents, wrong ingredients, without active ingredients, with
insufficient quantity of active ingredient, or with fake packag-
ing.17 The term counterfeit medicine was generally accepted
when first used in 1988 by WHO, but is now increasingly
perceived as associated with intellectual property rights,
rather than with public health. It has been proposed to
replace “counterfeit” in WHO’s definition with “falsified,”
and to reserve the term “counterfeit medicine” for a “falsi-
fied” medicine with a “counterfeit” trademark.18 In this
paper, as the participating countries have not adopted the
term “falsified,” we continue to use the term “counterfeit”
by WHO’s definition, but devoid of intellectual property
implications. Substandard medicines are “genuine medi-
cines produced by manufacturers authorized. . ..which do
not meet quality specifications set for them by national
standards.”3,18–20 Subtherapeutic amounts of active pharma-
ceutical ingredients (APIs) and/or suboptimal release of API
(dissolution) are often found in substandard medicines and
sometimes in counterfeit medicines, exposing parasites to
sublethal concentrations of the APIs, hence engendering
drug resistance.11
There is evidence that counterfeit/substandard essential
medicines are important public health problems in southeast
Asia.2,9,21 To investigate the quality of medicines and foster
collaboration between DRAs, police, and customs, suspect
medicines were collected by seizures and market surveillance.
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We present the laboratory findings and discuss their regula-
tory and public health implications.
MATERIALS ANDMETHODS
Samples. Samples were collected by the national DRA
inspection staff in the seven participating countries (Cambodia,
Indonesia, Lao PDR (Laos), Myanmar (Burma), Singapore,
Thailand, and Vietnam) and submitted to the Health Sciences
Authority (HSA), Singapore, Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, and the Georgia Institute of
Technology (GT), Atlanta, GA for chemical analysis. Samples
were collected for Storm 1 between April 2008 andMarch 2009
and Storm II between July and November 2009.
We define a sample as a group of apparently physically
identical dosage units (e.g., tablets or vials) with the same
batch number and brand name obtained at the same time
from the same outlet. DRAs were requested by INTERPOL
to focus on four classes of essential medicines (antimalarials,
antibiotics, anti-HIV, and anti-tuberculosis). The findings
discussed here are related to the antibiotics and antimalarials
collected. The aim of this work was not to estimate the preva-
lence of counterfeit and substandard medicines in the sampled
countries,22 but to pilot collaborative investigations between
DRAs, police, and customs in identifying medicine quality
problems and build these linkages. Samples were given unique
identifiers and information on sampling location and type of
outlet, submitter’s details, manufacturing information (manu-
facturer, manufacturing and expiry dates, batch numbers), and
the chemical and packaging analysis results were recorded.
Authentic reference samples.Thirty-nine authentic reference
samples were provided by the Cambodia Drug Regulatory
Organisation, Vietnam Drug Quality Management Divi-
sion, Sanofi Synthelabo Viet Nam, Eli Lilly and Company,
Mekophar Chemical Pharmaceutical Joint-Stock Company,
Guilin Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd, and Kunming Pharmaceu-
tical Corp. Of these samples, 2 were antibiotics and 18
were antimalarials.
Chemical and packaging analysis. Chemical and packaging
analysis of all samples was performed at HSA except for the
antimalarials collected in Operation Storm II, which were
analyzed at CDC and GT.
Chemical analysis. The samples received by HSA were ana-
lyzed for their chemical composition, including the active
pharmaceutical ingredients (API). Coatings and cores of the
tablets, capsule shells, and contents were analyzed by Fourier
transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) (Nicolet 380 with
Centaurus Microscope, Thermo Scientific, Waltham, MA) and
Raman spectroscopy (RM1000, Renishaw, Wotton-under-Edge,
Gloucester, UK; DXR Smart Raman and DXR Raman Micro-
scope, Thermo Scientific). High-performance liquid chroma-
tography (HPLC) with UV detection (Agilent 1200 HPLC,
Agilent, Santa Clara, CA) was used to determine %API using
methods described in the United States Pharmacopoeia (USP),
British Pharmacopoeia (BP), or International Pharmacopoeia
(IP). The number of tablets or capsules used for chemical assay
followed the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes
(ENFSI) drug sampling guidelines (United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime [UNODC] with ENFSI Drugs Working
Group, 2009).23 The tablets were ground and the capsule con-
tents were mixed and homogenized. A composite of the ground
tablets or mixed capsule contents was analyzed in duplicate.
At CDC, antimalarials and co-trimoxazole antibiotics were
analyzed by a modified HPLC protocol.24 Briefly, all tablets
were pulverized, dissolved in the appropriate solvent, and
filtered using a 0.22 mm nylon membrane. A portion of the
extract was injected into the HPLC system. Component sepa-
ration was achieved using a 150 + 4.6 mm octadecylsilica
column and a mobile phase consisting of various proportions
of acetonitrile and 0.05 M perchlorate buffer adjusted to a pH
of 2.5 with UV detection. In addition, two different direct
ionization mass spectrometry (MS) methods were used: Direct
Analysis in Real Time (DART) (DART-100, IonSense,
Saugus, MA) and Desorption Electrospray Ionization-MS
(DESI) (custom built) in both conventional and reactive
modes.25,26 Four dosage units (individual tablets or capsules)
were examined for each sample, unless fewer than 4 units
were submitted. In both laboratories, the primary reference
range for %API used was 85–115% but we also express the
results in the more stringent %API 90–110% limits.
Packaging analysis. Packaging analysis was conducted at
HSA and at the Lao-Oxford-Mahosot Hospital Wellcome
Trust Research Unit (LOMWRU). At HSA, the printing
quality and defects, and security features of the packaging
(carton, blister pack, leaflet insert), tablets and capsules, and
the debossing marks of batch numbers, manufacturing and
expiry dates on cartons, blister packs and tablets were exam-
ined and compared with authentic reference samples, if avail-
able, using a comparison microscope and a forensic light
source with light of varying wavelengths (405–525 nm). Batch
numbers, manufacturing and expiry dates, color, dimensions,
prints, defects, and marks of the packaging, tablets, and cap-
sules were documented. Similar analysis was performed at
LOMWRU except that a light source of 375 nm was used
and debossing marks were not analyzed.
Interpretation and classification. Authentic reference sam-
ples are important for classification of a sample as “counter-
feit,” “substandard,” or “authentic.” Using WHO’s definition,
we classified a medicine as “counterfeit”(approximating falsi-
fied) if the dosage form and/or packaging was falsified. The
dosage form was considered counterfeit if it contained the
wrong type of API or no API. The packaging was considered
counterfeit if the type and quality of printing, or security
features differ from that of the authentic reference packaging.
Substandard medicines were classified as those that had
authentic packaging but with stated API outside pharmaco-
peial limits. Of note, substandard medicines could not be
distinguished from degraded medicines.27
We requested DRAs and manufacturers for reference sam-
ples of authentic products. If available, the authenticity of a
suspect sample could be determined, and counterfeit and sub-
standard samples distinguished. If the authentic reference
sample was unavailable, we classified suspect samples accord-
ing to their %API, primarily as poor quality if outside the
range 85–115% and also secondarily if outside the range
90–110% API. The results have been reported using the
MEDQUARG guidelines where possible.22
RESULTS
Ninety-three antibiotic samples and 95 antimalarial samples,
comprising a median (range) of 1 (1–5) and 1 (1–12) dosage
units, respectively, were collected (Table 1 and Supplemental
Table 1).
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Antibiotics. The 93 antibiotic samples, collected in
Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, contained 11 stated APIs:
amoxicillin, ampicillin, chloramphenicol, ciprofloxacin, cloxa-
cillin, doxycycline hyclate, erythromycin, metronidazole,
phenoxymethylpenicillin (penicillin V, Pen-V), sulfamethoxazole-
trimethoprim, and tetracycline. Only two reference amoxicillin
samples, “AMOX-MS” manufactured by Medical Supply
Pharmaceutical Enterprise and “Amoxicillin” manufactured
by Bailly-Creat, were available for comparison.
Fifty-four (58%) antibiotics were classed as having %API
within the 90–110% range (including three with authentic
packaging available for comparison) and one had %API
> 115%, 28 had %API < 85% (including one counterfeit),
and an additional 10 had %API between 85% and < 90%.
Therefore, using the %API < 85 > 115% limits, 29 (31%)
failed and using the more stringent criteria of %API < 90
> 110%, 39 (42%) failed.
As we were only able to obtain two reference samples for
comparison, we cannot be certain whether most failed sam-
ples were counterfeit or substandard. Fourteen (15%) of the
antibiotics collected were in plastic bags without labeling as
to API content, batch number and/or manufacturer informa-
tion (Cambodia–Pen V–1, Cambodia–tetracycline–1, Laos–
ampicillin–1, Laos–tetracycline–1, Thailand–Pen V–3, Thailand–
tetracycline–7).
Of the 20 ampicillin samples, 13 (65%) samples contained
< 85% of the stated ampicillin content, with 3 samples con-
taining API < 50%. One ampicillin sample, labeled as
“AMPIMEX-500,” stated to contain 500 mg ampicillin, and
labeled as manufactured by “Fu Li Pharmaceutical China,”
was classed as counterfeit. Not only did the sample contain
only 15% of the stated API (76.7 mg/cap of ampicillin), it
also contained amoxicillin (66.6 mg/cap), an API which was
not specified on the packaging. The presence of amoxicillin
in the sample was easily identified by Raman spectroscopy
(Figure 1).
Four amoxicillin samples, including two labeled as man-
ufactured by “Baily-Creat” and two labeled as “AMOX-MS”
manufactured by “Medical Supply Pharmaceutical Enter-
prise,” were classified as authentic. The “AMOX-MS
(500 mg)” sample bore similar machine marks on the embossed
expiry date and lot number on the blister pack as those on the
blister pack of the authentic reference sample, suggesting that
they were manufactured on the same machine (Figure 2).
Three manufacturers—“Laboratories EPHAC Co.,”
“Glenmark,” and “Shijiazhuang Ouyi Pharmaceutical” were
stated on the labeling as the producers of products that on
analysis contained unacceptable %API. Amoxicillin, ampicil-
lin, and tetracycline products labeled as from the former two
manufacturers contained lower than the stated API, at
70 to < 90% of the amounts stated on the packaging.
Amoxicillin and ampicillin were present at only 40–50%
of the stated amounts for the samples labeled as from
“Shijiazhuang Ouyi Pharmaceutical.” As we were not able to
obtain authentic reference samples from these manufac-
turers, we could not ascertain whether these products
were counterfeit.
Antimalarials. The 95 antimalarial samples, collected in
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam,
contained 9 different APIs, including monotherapies
(artesunate, artemether, chloroquine, mefloquine, and
quinine) and co-formulated/co-blistered combination ther-
apies (dihydroartemisinin [DHA]-piperaquine phosphate,
sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine, artesunate + amodiaquine, and
artesunate + mefloquine).
Fifty-eight (61%) of the 95 antimalarial samples were
classed as having %API within the 90–110% range (with
18 having authentic packaging for comparison); 1 was coun-
terfeit, 5 (5%) had %API > 115%, with an additional 2 with
API > 110%, 25 (26%) had %API < 85% with an additional
5 (5%) having API < 90%. Therefore, using the %API < 85
> 115% limits, 30 (32%) failed and using the more stringent
criteria of %API < 90 > 110%, 37 (39%) failed.
Twelve (13%) of the antimalarial samples collected were
in plastic bags without labeling as to API, batch number, and/
or manufacturer information (Cambodia chloroquine-18,
Figure 1. Raman spectra of an ampicillin sample labeled as “AMPIMEX-500” (red) and an amoxicillin standard (green). Amoxicillin, not stated
in the label of “AMPIMEX-500,” was detected in the Raman spectrum of the capsule content.
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Vietnam chloroquine-1, Vietnam quinine-1, Lao quinine-10,
Thailand chloroquine-2, Thailand quinine-1). The 34 oral
artesunate monotherapy samples were labeled as manufactured
by 8 different companies with 10 different types of packag-
ing. Seven (21%) contained %API outside the 85–115%
range with an additional 3 (15%) outside the 90–110% range.
Co-formulated DHA-piperaquine from Cambodia bore the
text “2 days malaria treatment” on the packaging.
Two artesunate samples were collected in Laos, labeled as
manufactured by “Mekophar” with one containing 86% and
the other 144% of the dose of artesunate stated on the
blisterpack. Although the print designs on the blisterpacks
were different from the authentic reference samples, we were
unable to determine if the design was a legitimate variation
from Mekophar. One “artesunate” sample collected in Laos,
labeled as manufactured by “Guilin Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd,”
contained no detectable artesunate, but mainly calcium car-
bonate, as determined by FTIR, Raman spectroscopy, and
HPLC assays. Inspection of the blister packaging (Figure 3A
and B) indicated that these were counterfeits with packaging
similar to Type 1 counterfeit artesunate seized in Operation
Jupiter.8 The blisterpacks did not bear any holograms, the
print quality was inferior to authentic reference samples and
they bore incorrect Chinese characters “ ” and “ .” Two
additional samples of oral artesunate, containing within range
API, had differences in packaging from the available authen-
tic samples but discussions with the manufacturer suggested
that they were probably authentic.
DISCUSSION
This investigation highlights the frequency of counterfeit
and substandard medicines in southeast Asia; that is, 32% of
antimalarials and 31% of antibiotics analyzed were poor qual-
ity using the %API 85–115% range. These samples were col-
lected as they were suspected of being poor quality and the
sampling methodology does not allow these data to be used to
estimate the prevalence of counterfeit and substandard medi-
cines. However, the presence of these drugs in the market
poses an important public health threat. Counterfeit and sub-
standard essential medicines have important implications for
the therapy of individual patients and control of both malaria
and bacterial pathogens. The lower-than-expected API contents
of counterfeit/substandard drugs are likely to be subtherapeu-
tic and to engender pathogen drug resistance,28 which in turn
has enormous deleterious effects on global public health.29
That any oral monotherapy artesunate was collected in
2009 is also alarming, as they have not been recommended
by WHO for the treatment of uncomplicated falciparum
malaria since 2007,30 and are likely to drive antimalarial
Figure 2. Magnified views of the numerals and characters of the lot number and expiry date: “87,” “X,” and “11,” on the blister packs of the
suspect sample “AMOX-MS (500 mg)” and the authentic reference sample.
108 YONG AND OTHERS
artemisinin resistance.14,31 Monotherapy and poor-quality
artemisinin derivatives and artemisinin-combination thera-
pies (ACT), along with poor prescription and poor adherence,
are likely to be important contributors to the recent rise of
artemisinin resistance of Plasmodium falciparum malaria in
western Cambodia.32 The finding of an ACT stating that it is a
“2 days malaria treatment” is also of great concern as the
evidence available strongly suggests that a minimum of a
3-day course is required and is contrary to WHO malaria
treatment guidelines33 and will, again, increase mortality,
morbidity, and engender drug resistance.
That 13% and 15% of antimalarials and antibiotics, respec-
tively, were in plastic bags without labeling as to API content,
batch number, and/or manufacturer information is also
alarming. Such plastic bags, but containing multiple different
medicines, have been described from the Thai/Burma border34
and the Thailand/Cambodia.35 These poorly prescribed phar-
maceuticals risk treatment failure, poor patient adherence
and engender antimicrobial resistance.
Limitations of this report include the lack of authentic
reference samples available for comparison with most of the
collected samples. Without these reference samples, the
authenticity of drug dosage forms and packaging could not
be ascertained. Despite writing to the manufacturers, we had
great difficulty in obtaining authentic samples, as has been
described.28 Greater responsiveness by the pharmaceutical
industry to such legitimate requests would be very helpful.
As a result of the lack of authentic reference samples, often
only the %API is used for interpretation, which is insufficient
to allow confident classification as counterfeit or substandard
and some of those samples failing chemical assays may have
been counterfeit rather than substandard. Irrespective of the
origins of the poor-quality antimalarials and antibiotics, it is
notable that DRAs suspicions that the collected medicines
Figure 3. (A and B) Scans of counterfeit artesunate sample labeled as manufactured by “Guilin Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd,” in comparison to an
authentic standard demonstrating error in Chinese character.
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were poor quality were correct for some 1/3 of samples. The
features that aroused their suspicions cannot be shared,
because of the risk of assisting those counterfeiting medicines.
It was also not possible to distinguish whether those that
failed the %API criteria, containing less than the stated
amount of active ingredient were substandard or degraded or
to detect repackaged expired drug based on %API. Hence,
some of the samples classified as substandard may have been
produced to good standards but degraded within the distribu-
tion chain due to poor storage. Field and laboratory mass
spectrometric data of the consequences of degradation may
help make this distinction and gauge their expected clinical
impact. Until such information is available, it would be impor-
tant for DRAs to inspect the manufacturers of failing prod-
ucts to determine whether the manufactured products leave
the factory with appropriate %API. It is likely that those
containing too much active ingredient are substandard, rather
than degraded, but we cannot be certain of this without more
information about decomposition of these products. There is
very little real life information on the consequences of storage
of antimalarials, or indeed for any medicine class, in hot
tropical environments27,36 and on the chemical and physical
consequences for medicines.
A further unresolved issue with such studies is that fewer
tablets/capsules/vials than stated in pharmacopoeias are usu-
ally available.28 There also remains uncertainty as to the
appropriate cutoffs for %API. We have used the 85–115%
uniformity of dosage criteria but also included the more strin-
gent criteria of 90–110%.37
Counterfeit drug analysis requires the analysis of both the
drug dosage form and the packaging. Usually both aspects
are counterfeit if the sample is counterfeit but occasionally,
Table 1
Summary of combined results for samples collected as part of Operations Storm I and Storm II
Country Medicine/formulation
API results summary no. of failed samples
(85–115%)/no. of samples (% failed) Classification/notes
Cambodia Amoxicillin po 2/16 (12.5%) Failed −
Ampicillin po 8/15 (53%) Failed One contained 15% API plus amoxicillin 66.6 mg/cap,
classified as counterfeit
Penicillin V po 1/5 (20%) Failed One dosage unknown, API content assumed
Tetracycline po 1/14 (7%) Failed One dosage unknown, API content assumed
Chloramphenicol po 0/1 Failed −
Ciprofloxacin po 0/2 Failed −
Cloxacillin po 1/1 (100%) Failed −
Metronidazole po 0/1 Failed −
Artesunate po 3/10 (33%) Failed One with API > 115%
Artemether po 0/1 Failed −
DHA-piperaquine po 2/3 (67%) Failed Wrongly labeled as “2 days malaria treatment”
Mefloquine + artesunate po 2/7 (29%) Failed Co-blistered mefloquine tablets missing from 2 samples
and therefore no mefloquine chemical data
Chloroquine po 1/7 (14%) Failed 1 with API > 115%. Dosages unknown,
API content assumed
Lao PDR Amoxicillin po 5/6 (83%) Failed −
Ampicillin po 5/5 (100%) Failed −
Tetracycline po 1/2 (50%) Failed API > 115%
Co-trimoxazole po 4/4 (100%) Failed Great variations in sulfamethoxazole content within
blisters—all out of 85–115% API; all four with
trimethoprim < 85%
Ciprofloxacin po 1/4 (25%) Failed −
Artesunate po 2/14 (14%) Failed One counterfeit (no API with Type 1 fake packaging)
Artesunate iv/im 0/1 Failed −
Quinine po 9/10 (90%) Failed Dosages unknown, API content assumed
Quinine iv 0/1 Failed −
Chloroquine po 1/1 (100%) Failed API > 115%
Sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine po 3/3 (100%) Failed One with sulfadoxine > 115%
Indonesia Artesunate iv/im 0/2 Failed −
Artemether im 0/1 Failed −
Artesunate + amodiaquine po 1/4 (25%) Failed −
Vietnam Artesunate po 1/5 (20%) Failed −
Chloroquine po 0/3 Failed −
Quinine po 0/1 Failed −
Sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine po 0/3 Failed −
Myanmar/Burma Artesunate po 1/4 (25%) Failed −
Artemether po 0/4 Failed −
Mefloquine po 0/1 Failed −
Mefloquine + artesunate po 0/1 Failed −
Thailand Doxycycline po 0/1 Failed −
Tetracycline po 0/8 Failed Four dosages unknown, API content assumed
Penicillin V po 0/7 Failed One dosage unknown, API content assumed
Artesunate po 0/1 Failed −
Artesunate iv 0/1 Failed −
Chloroquine po 3/5 (60%) Failed One dosage unknown, API content assumed
Quinine po 1/1 (100%) Failed API > 115%, dosage unknown, API content assumed
API = active pharmaceutical ingredient; DHA = dihydroartemisinin; iv = intravenous; im = intramuscular; po = per oral.
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there are examples in which the drug dosage form is counterfeit
and the packaging is genuine, or vice versa, for example, in cases
where authentic dosage forms are placed in counterfeited pack-
aging to extend the expiry date.38 Counterfeiters are looking for
sustainable business and may manufacture counterfeit medi-
cines with the correct type of APIs, and even the correct
amount of APIs.38,39
During these operations, customs, DRAs, and police in
each participating country conducted joint operations, with
support from INTERPOL, WHO, and WCO and the private
sectors. This helped build capacity for medicine regulation.
Synergism, at the national, regional, and international levels,
will be extremely important in combating trade in poor-quality
medicines through facilitating vital information and intelli-
gence exchange, leading to enhanced joint actions and ulti-
mately improved medicine quality, and should be greatly
encouraged. The WHO RapidAlert system provides an
important means for enhancing these linkages.40
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